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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with the determinants of labour out-migration from agriculture across 149 EU 
regions over the 1990–2008 period. The central aim is to shed light on the role played by 
payments from the common agricultural policy (CAP) on this important adjustment process. 
Using static and dynamic panel data estimators, we show that standard neoclassical drivers, like 
relative income and the relative labour share, represent significant determinants of the 
intersectoral migration of agricultural labour. Overall, CAP payments contributed significantly to 
job creation in agriculture, although the magnitude of the economic effect was rather moderate. 
We also find that pillar I subsidies exerted an effect approximately two times greater than that of 
pillar II payments.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last 50 years, EU countries have experienced dramatic adjustments in the 
agricultural labour market, showing an impressive out-farm migration of the labour force. 
Surprisingly, in the most recent decades, we do not find any substantial reduction in the 
migration rate, a stylised fact that is at odds with €50 billion per year of income subsidies 
spent by the common agricultural policy (CAP).1  
Indeed, the empirical evidence on the effect of agricultural subsidies on out-farm migration is 
quite inconclusive. Among the literature, there are papers that find a negative impact of 
subsidies on out-farm migration (e.g. Breustedt & Glauben, 2007; D’Antoni & Mishra, 2010), 
papers that find no effect (e.g. Barkley, 1990; Glauben et al., 2006) and even papers that find 
a positive effect of subsidies on farm out-migration (e.g. Dewbre & Mishra, 2007; Petrick & 
Zier, 2011). 
One interpretation of this counterintuitive pattern is that the agricultural subsidies have been 
ineffective as an income support policy,2 especially because of the imperfections in both input 
and output markets. Different channels have been emphasised through which farm subsidies 
may affect agricultural employment, accounting for the mixed evidence summarised above. 
For example, Barkley (1990) stressed that an indirect impact of subsidies may have occurred 
through increased land values.3 Land value appreciation slows down the rate of labour 
migration out of agriculture. By contrast, Goetz & Debertin (1996) argue that capital–labour 
substitution effects may represent a driver of the positive correlation between farm subsidies 
and out-farm migration. More recently, Berlinschi et al. (2011) found evidence of another 
                                                        
* Alessandro Olper is Associate Professor at the Department of Economics, Management and 
Quantitative Methods, Università degli Studi di Milano and Associate Researcher at LICOS Centre for 
Institutions and Economic Performance, Catholic University of Leuven. Valentina Raimondi and 
Daniele Cavicchioli are researchers at the Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative 
Methods, Università degli Studi di Milano. Mauro Vigani is a post-doc at the Department of 
Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, Università degli Studi di Milano (current position 
at the European Commission, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, Joint Research Center). 
Corresponding author: Alessandro Olper (alessandro.olper@unimi.it). 
1 The rate of out-farm migration in the EU-15 has been equal to about 2.5-3% per annum over the last 
two decades. 
2 For example, an important OECD (2001) study emphasised that only 20% of all agricultural support 
policies resulted in the net growth of farm income in OECD countries, with the bulk of the aid being 
dissipated elsewhere, for example to the owners of production factors. 
3 Yet while studies from the US show that landowners capture a substantial share of subsidies (e.g. 
Goodwin et al., 2005; Kirwan, 2009; Lence & Mishra, 2003), recent evidence from the EU shows that 
CAP subsidies are only marginally capitalised into land values (see Ciaian et al., 2011; Michalek et al., 
2011; Ciaian & Kancs, 2012). 
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indirect channel, the effect of subsidies on the educational level of farmers’ children and the 
resulting impact on long-term labour supply. 
These and other indirect effects of farm subsidies clearly deserve attention to better 
understand the key mechanisms responsible for the puzzling effect on agricultural labour 
summarised above. In this paper, however, we argue that when the direct effect of farm 
subsidies is properly estimated, at least in the context of the EU regions investigated here, we 
consistently find that on average the farm support programme has had a negative effect on 
out-farm labour participation. Thus, the CAP contributes to job creation in agriculture.  
The creation and maintenance of jobs in agriculture and in rural areas has been a traditional 
CAP objective – one recently re-stated and underlined in several EU official documents (e.g. 
European Commission, 2010a; European Parliament, 2010).4 Yet, especially owing to data 
limitations, evidence concerning the effect of CAP subsidies on off-farm labour migration has 
been rather inconclusive. Moreover, it is mostly confined to specific country or regional case 
studies, only rarely providing a European-wide perspective (Shucksmith et al., 2005; Petrick 
& Zier, 2011). Therefore, although interesting and often rich in detailed interpretations, such 
studies measure the CAP effects only within a single country or region, an approach that has 
the advantage of keeping factors like institutions fixed and circumventing problems 
associated with cross-country/regional analyses. Still, one of the shortcomings of these 
studies is that the findings are difficult to generalise to other countries and regions where 
there are wide differences in development, labour market institutions and farming structures. 
Until now the lack of comparable and consistent estimates of CAP payments at the EU 
regional level has prevented the adoption of an approach that takes into account both cross-
country and cross-regional observable and unobservable heterogeneities.5 
The main objective of this paper is to offer a preliminary contribution that moves in that 
direction. Specifically, the paper investigates the effect of CAP payments on intersectoral 
labour reallocation, extending earlier studies in three main directions. First, our analysis has 
broad coverage, considering 149 EU regions over the period from 1990 to 2008. Second, the 
effects of CAP instruments are analysed, concentrating on both pillar I payments (coupled 
and decoupled subsidies) and on several pillar II instruments for rural development. Notably, 
with the exception of Petrick & Zier (2011), who studied the entire portfolio of CAP measures, 
previous analyses have normally considered only one instrument at a time or an aggregate of 
various policies. This approach is problematic, however, as different policies can have 
different effects on job creation in agriculture. Third, we rely on modern panel data methods, 
estimating both static and dynamic migration equations in order to account for several 
identification issues, such as unobserved heterogeneity, dynamics and endogeneity. Finally, 
we undertake a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the net benefits of the CAP in terms of 
farm job creation. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a short review 
of the empirical literature to date. Section 3 presents our conceptual framework and the 
empirical strategy for investigating the effects of the CAP on labour migration. Section 4 
describes the data and how we measure the CAP payments at the EU regional level. In section 
5, the results are presented and discussed. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
                                                        
4 The European Commission’s (2010b) reflection about the future of the CAP (Communication on the 
CAP towards 2020, COM(2010) 672) explicitly addressed agricultural and rural labour issues in 
several sections of the document. Labour and rural employment issues are also well represented in the 
recent European Parliament (2010) document on CAP reforms, On the Future of the CAP after 2013 
(EP 439.972).  
5 A notable exception is the paper by Esposti (2007), who investigated the effect of CAP pillar I 
payments on economic growth and convergence across EU regions over the 1989–2000 period.  
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2. Previous evidence 
In this section we summarise the literature on the effect of agricultural and rural subsidies on 
the labour market. Theoretically, the studies can be divided into two main approaches. The 
first looks at agricultural household models to analyse the impact of subsidies on the 
allocation of household labour (Lee, 1965; Becker, 1965).6 In this framework, subsidies 
directed at farm income support may affect farmers’ decisions on labour allocation in a 
number of ways: increasing the marginal value of farm labour, increasing household wealth 
and reducing income variability. While a coupled payment increases the marginal value of 
farm work, decoupled payments are considered a source of non-labour income.  
The other approach focuses on the change in labour markets resulting from the entry and exit 
processes from one sector to another. The decision to exit or enter farming is normally 
analysed using models of occupational choice that have their roots in the Todaro (1969) and 
Harris & Todaro (1970) two-sector model. In this framework, the choice of occupation is 
determined by comparing the discounted utility derived from each alternative job over the 
career of the individual, taking into account the net costs of changing occupation and the 
probability of obtaining a job in the other sector (see Mundlak, 1979). 
The above distinction is also reflected in empirical works, with studies at the farm-household 
level largely based on microdata at the farm level, and studies on farm labour (re)allocation 
conducted at the aggregate (country or regional) level. Microdata allow us to address the 
individual adjustment behaviour in response to changes in factors affecting the household 
utility, such as alternative revenue sources. For example, Mishra & Goodwin (1997), using a 
Tobit model on farm households located in Kansas, found that policy changes reducing farm 
income support can increase the off-farm employment of farmers and their spouses. 
Similarly, El-Osta et al. (2004) investigated the effect of payments under the US Agricultural 
Market Transition Act on agricultural labour supply using 2001 data. Results indicate that 
government payments tend to increase the hours that operators work on-farm and vice versa. 
There are also important examples of microdata analysis using panel data (e.g. Pietola et al., 
2003; Gullstrand & Tezic, 2008) and semi-parametric approaches (e.g. Pufahl & Weiss, 
2009; Esposti, 2011a).7  
Nevertheless, available farm-level data are often time constrained. This can impede an in-
depth analysis of general economic conditions and agricultural policy, as these factors 
concern all the farmers in a specific region, and any existing time dimension of the studies is 
typically very short (Glauben et al., 2006). Moreover, it is not always clear how much the 
results from farm-level studies, mostly based on survey data, are representative of the entire 
population. 
The analysis at the aggregate level is, in principle, less data constrained, enhancing panel 
data methods and providing results with broader coverage. The process of labour migration 
from one sector to another is assessed by controlling for such structural variables as country 
or regional relative income, unemployment, population densities, and for institutional and 
policy variables. Econometric approaches of aggregate studies range from cross-sectional to 
                                                        
6 In the basic household model, individuals behave in accordance with a well-defined utility function 
accounting for household production, consumption and leisure. To maximise their utility, farm 
households choose to allocate time between leisure and on- and off-farm labour. 
7 In recent years, there has been a growing tendency to use semi-parametric approaches, like 
propensity-score matching, to study the economic effects of EU policy in general (e.g. Becker et al., 
2010; 2012) and of CAP subsidies in particular (e.g. Pufahl & Weiss, 2009; Esposti, 2011a; Salvioni & 
Sciulli, 2011; Ciaian et al., 2011). Generally speaking, these quasi-experimental methods have several 
advantages with respect to standard regression tools, but they also have some drawbacks. For example, 
when applied to the CAP pillar I subsidies − a quasi-horizontal measure − finding suitable 
counterfactuals (controls) tends to be a challenge (see Esposti, 2011a; 2011b). 
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time-series analyses, and more recently panel data methods and also quasi-experimental 
approaches.  
The seminal work of Barkley (1990) used a two-sector, occupational choice model on a large 
time series (from 1940 to 1985) to analyse the labour migration out of agriculture in the US, 
using government payments as a key variable. Results show that the effect of farm support on 
agricultural labour is negative but insignificant. The author interprets this result by arguing 
that it might stem from two offsetting effects of different government payments. Indeed, 
income subsidies, like price support and target price, are expected to reduce the rate of out-
farm migration, while other farm policies, like acreage set-asides, inducing land diversion, 
can reduce the need for inputs that complement the land, resulting in increased out-farm 
migration. This interpretation, however, is at odds with the findings of D’Antoni & Mishra 
(2010). They extended Barkley’s sample to 2007, also accounting for dynamics, through an 
autoregressive distributed lag model. By taking dynamics into account, the farm support 
effect on out-farm labour migration became significantly negative.  
At the EU level, many studies have investigated the effect of national support policies (other 
than CAP payments) at the single country level (e.g. Pietola et al., 2003; Goodwin & Holt, 
2002; Benjamin & Kimhi, 2006; Glauben et al., 2006), while only a few studies have 
investigated the effect of CAP subsidies on out-farm migration. For empirical works at both 
the household and aggregate level, actual evidence of the direct effect of CAP subsidies on the 
off-farm labour participation/migration is quite inconclusive. Results are often confined to 
specific countries or regions (Pufahl & Weiss, 2009; Hennessy & Rehman, 2008; Gullstrand 
& Tezic, 2008), mainly as a consequence of data limitations at the EU regional level. Most of 
the authors have used a cross-sectional approach (Breustedt & Glauben, 2007; Hennessy & 
Rehman, 2008; Van Herck, 2009), while those who have performed a panel data analysis 
have considered only a single country or specific policy (or both), such as Objective 1 or agri-
environmental measures (Gullstrand & Tezic, 2008; Pufahl & Weiss, 2009; Salvioni & Sciulli, 
2011).  
Only a few studies have worked at the overall EU level. Breustedt & Glauben (2007) 
investigated the effect of total farm subsidies on out-farm labour migration in 110 EU NUTS 2 
regions, finding that CAP payments slowed down structural change in the 1993–97 period. 
Van Herck (2009) used a multinomial logit approach to investigate the main destination of 
households exiting the agricultural sector. Coupled, decoupled and total subsidies showed a 
positive effect on out-farm migration for 144 EU NUTS 2 regions, mainly as a consequence of 
secondary-order effects. Becker et al. (2010) used a regression-discontinuity design approach 
to study the total employment effect on 285 EU NUTS 2 regions for the 1989–2006 period. 
The results showed no significant effect on total employment of the structural funds 
programme (Objective 1). Finally, Petrick & Zier (2011), using a difference-in-difference 
(DID) estimator on three East German Länder, found a positive effect of coupled, decoupled 
and rural development payments respectively (but not agri-environment payments) on out-
farm labour migration. Their DID approach represents a relevant improvement, despite the 
results from three German Länder hardly being extendible to the EU as a whole.  
To sum up, the actual evidence concerning the effect of CAP payments on out-farm migration 
is not only quite inconclusive but it also suffers several drawbacks. First, the evidence comes 
mostly from cross-sectional inference. Second, it is often derived from country or regional 
case studies. Third, it rarely takes into account the entire portfolio of CAP payments. Last but 
not least, no particular effort has been given to accounting for the potential problems of 
endogeneity bias. Our paper takes advantage of a large sample of 149 European regions 
observed over 18 years to assess the direct effect of subsidies on out-farm labour migration, 
overcoming some of the drawbacks of previous literature. 
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3. Conceptual model and empirical strategy 
3.1 Out-farm migration equation 
This paper is empirical in nature. Still, to rationalise our work we sketch the theory of 
occupational choice and labour migration decisions, which has its roots in the Todaro (1969) 
and Harris & Todaro (1970) two-sector model, subsequently developed by Mundlak (1979).8 
Following Barkley (1990), let us consider individuals facing a given return in two mutually 
exclusive occupations i, say agricultural (i=1) and non-agricultural employment (i=2). The 
choice of occupation is determined by comparing the discounted utility derived from the job 
throughout their careers. A worker aged g who retires at time T will face an optimisation 
problem as described in equation (1), where r is the discount rate: 
 
∫ ∫ −−= −−Tg Tg ijtjtjtrtititrtik dtCLXVedtLXVeH ]),[(),(
 
(1) 
with Xit = qit wit Lit. 
Utility in the period t is a function of both consumption (Xit) and hours of work spent on the 
job (Lit). Migration of an individual from one occupation to another occurs when the expected 
utility derived from a potential profession rises above the utility expected from the current 
job, net of the costs incurred in changing profession (Cijt). We assume that agriculture i is the 
current occupation and j is some other non-agricultural occupation. Migration from i to j will 
occur when the net utility is negative (Hik < 0). 
Although the return to labour may be higher in a non-agricultural occupation than in 
farming, an agricultural worker involved in job search may discount the higher wage rate (wj) 
by the probability (qj) of obtaining employment in the non-agricultural sector. For that 
reason, migration from agriculture to other sectors does not occur instantaneously.9  
To calculate Hik, a potential migrant has to estimate the probability of obtaining a job in the 
industrial sector. Clearly, this probability is affected by macroeconomic conditions, such as 
the unemployment rate and the relative size of the sectoral labour forces. Other things being 
equal, the larger the non-agricultural labour market, the easier it should be to obtain a job 
there. Yet as most migrations are out of agriculture, migration will also increase with the size 
of the labour force in agriculture (Larson & Mundlak, 1997). Moreover, economic conditions 
in the agricultural sector, such as government payments or the structure of the family farm, 
are also expected to affect the migration rate out of agriculture.  
The migration of individual k occurs if Hik < 0. As the empirical model considers the regional 
rates of net out-farm migration, an index function fik is used to separate migrants from non-
migrants. That is, Hik fik ≤ 0 where fik = 1 if Hik < 0 (migration occurs), fik = 0 if Hik ≥ 0 
(migration does not occur). This index function allows for the aggregation of individual 
migrants by the summation across fik. The gross migration rate Mij from occupation i to 
occupation j during one period can be written as 
                                                        
8 The Harris & Todaro (1970) model is a modification of the original Todaro (1969) model, which adds 
a two-sector, neoclassical trade model to the analysis. The model uses traditional neoclassical 
mechanisms and introduces a migration equation, which represents its innovative feature.  
9 Note that the return to labour in this model works as summary statistics, in the sense that structural 
parameters like the substitutability of capital for labour, the (low) income consumption elasticity of 
farm products and the productivity growth rate are supposed to affect the migration rate solely 
through their effect on the relative returns to labour in the farm and non-farm sectors. For a two-
sector growth model with a farm–non-farm wage gap that explicitly considers these structural 
parameters, see Dennis & Iscan (2007).  
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, (2) 
where I is the people employed in occupation i. 
Because of people flow from one sector to another and vice versa, the net out-farm migration 
can be defined as m = Mij – Mji, where m represents our dependent variable in the empirical 
model.  
3.2 Measurement issues 
In practice, due to data limitations, migration flows in both directions are not observable. 
Previous empirical applications measured out-farm migration simply as the growth rate in 
agricultural employment from one year to the next, disregarding the dynamics in the total 
labour force (e.g. Barkley, 1990; D’Antoni & Mishra 2010). This approach can be a reasonable 
approximation when the exercise is conducted within a single country. Working across the 
EU regions, however, as in the present study, disregarding the differences in the total labour 
force dynamics at the regional level can introduce a systematic bias in the estimates of 
intersectoral labour migration. 
To reduce this potential source of bias, the approach of Larson & Mundlak (1997) has been 
followed, assuming that without migration labour in agriculture and non-agriculture would 
grow at the same rate as the total labour force. Deviation from this rate is attributed to 
migration. Formally, the net migration rate is estimated using the following relation: 
 11111 ])1([ −− −+= ttt LLnLm , (3) 
where 11)( −−−= ttt LLLn is the growth rate of the total labour force.  
It is important to point out that using equation (3) to estimate the out-farm migration of 
labour is not immune to other potential shortcomings. Indeed, a first drawback lies in the 
fact that it does not take into account part-time farming, which has become an important 
characteristic of the EU agricultural labour market. Hence, it potentially leads to a 
heterogeneous underestimation of the out migration of labour, as part-time farming differs 
significantly across EU regions. Thus, our empirical strategy has to be robust to this and 
other forms of regional heterogeneity. A second issue is that to measure the migration rate we 
should use data on labour. Yet, as better explained in the data section, the disposable regional 
sources do not report data on agricultural labour, but rather on agricultural employment. 
This introduces volatility into the series because we are introducing demand shocks in the 
migration estimates.10  
3.3 Econometric approach 
Armed with this simple theoretical logic and following previous works, the rate of out-farm 
migration m is expected to be primarily a function of the relative per-capita income between 
non-farm and farm activities (RI), and all other factors affecting the costs incurred to change 
profession (C).  
Our main goal is to isolate the effect of the CAP on the rate of out-farm migration. Following 
the model’s logic, to the extent that CAP subsidies (S) are effective in transferring income to 
farmers, their effect should decrease the farmers’ propensity to migrate to another sector, 
ceteris paribus. Empirically the rate of out-farm migration of the EU region i at time t can be 
represented by the following benchmark equation: 
                                                        
10 Note, however, that previous papers faced the same issue (see Barkley, 1990; Larson & Mundlak, 
2003; D’Antoni & Mishra, 2010).  
DOES THE CAP REDUCE THE MIGRATION OF FARM LABOUR? | 7 
 ititititit ZSRIm νβββ ++++= −−− 112110 , (4) 
where Z is a vector including all other observable factors, such as the relative labour share 
and the unemployment rate, which affect the migration costs, C, and itν is the error term. If 
the neoclassical drivers, RI and S, have direct and independent effects on the migration rate 
m, then we should expect that 01 >β and 02 <β , respectively. 
The assumption about the error term is critical for our identification hypothesis. Our main 
concern in estimating equation (4) is omitted variable bias due to factors correlated with our 
key variables of interest. We assume that the error term ititit εμαν ++=  comprises time 
fixed effects common to all regions tα , time-invariant, regional fixed effects iμ  and a time-
varying component itε . Therefore, by including time and regional fixed effects, equation (4) 
is equivalent to a DID estimator. The fixed effects control for both observed and unobserved 
(regional) heterogeneity, rendering the assumption of exogeneity of our right-hand side 
variables more credible. This consideration is of vital importance for properly identifying the 
average effect of the CAP payments on regional out-farm migration. Indeed, the inclusion of 
fixed effects controls for (time-invariant) observable and unobservable differences in the unit 
of observations, such as the stock of human capital, the age structure of the farm population 
or the share of land under property. These are all variables that can affect a farmer’s decision 
to migrate, but which change very slowly over time.  
Nevertheless, the inclusion of fixed effects does a good job in resolving endogeneity bias due 
to regional heterogeneity or selection bias (or both). Hence, our key identification 
assumption is that the policy variable, Sit, is not simultaneously determined with the regional 
rate of out-farm migration, mit. Different arguments may justify this assumption. First, 
because we work at the EU regional level, it appears plausible to assume that pillar I 
payments are exogenous to migration, given that these policies are decided at the EU level. In 
principle, this assumption may be more questionable when pillar II payments are considered. 
In this case, the policy-making process also falls under the responsibility of the EU regional 
institutions (Petrick & Zier, 2011), which may generate a potential problem of endogeneity 
bias owing to political economy motives (see Berlinschi et al., 2011). Still, the degree of 
freedom of regional governments to allocate money from pillar II affects only the equilibrium 
among different pillar II measures (and the axis), but not their aggregated level. The overall 
amount of pillar II expenditure is predetermined through a bargaining process at the EU and 
national levels.11 Thus, in our basic model we treat the policy variable as exogenous. To be 
more precise, because it is plausible to assume that the farmer’s choice to exit at time t is 
affected by the level of CAP support at time t-1, in equation (4) the term S as well as the other 
independent variables are always included as lagged by one year, thereby treated as 
predetermined variables.12  
A potential concern of using equation (4) is its static nature. D’Antoni & Mishra (2010) for 
the US as well as Petrick & Zier (2011) for three East German Länder showed that 
considerations of ‘dynamics’ may be important in studying the effect of farm subsidies on 
out-farm migration.13 To tackle this issue we also estimate a dynamic autoregressive 
specification: 
                                                        
11 Clearly this does not mean that some form of ‘compensation rule’ between pillar I and pillar II 
policies cannot work here. But to the extent to which this compensation is decided at the EU level, it 
should not then affect expenditure at the regional level, ceteris paribus. 
12 This approach also reduces the possible simultaneity in the model between farm migration and other 
right-hand side variables, especially relative income and unemployment.  
13 Specifically, D’Antoni & Mishra (2010) showed that moving from a static to a dynamic 
autoregressive specification matters for the final results. In a different vein, Petrick & Zier (2011) 
reported evidence of persistent lag structure for some CAP instruments. 
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ZSRImm εαμβββ +++++++= −−−− 1121110 . (5) 
Given the large cross-sections and the short time series of our data set, the correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term renders the least 
squared within estimator inconsistent. To avoid this inconsistency, we use a first difference, 
generalised method of moments (DIFF-GMM) estimator as an alternative to the within 
estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991). A DIFF-GMM estimator transforms the model into a two-
step procedure based on first difference to eliminate the fixed effects, as a first step. Next, in a 
second step, the lagged difference of the dependent variable is instrumented using the lagged 
differences and levels of the dependent variable.  
An important feature of the GMM estimator is the possibility of treating the key variable of 
interest – namely the CAP subsidies, S – as endogenous, using their lagged values as 
instruments and testing for their exogeneity. As a robustness check, we also follow this 
strategy. Because in the presence of variables that display high persistency – like policy 
variables – the DIFF-GMM estimator could also be biased, suffering weak instrument 
problems, we also use a system GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator that exploits the second 
moment condition of the level equation (Arellano & Bover, 1995).  
4. Data 
We start from an initial database of about 160 regions. Some regions are lost, however, due to 
the lack of data, while others are dropped, resulting in outliers after using specific measures 
of influence (i.e. DF-Beta). The final sample used for the empirical analysis covers 149 
regions of 15 EU countries, over the period 1990–2008.14 Table 1 shows the number of 
regions used for each country, according to EU NUTS regions, distinguishing between NUTS 
1 and NUTS 2. The choice to utilise both NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 was motivated by the necessity 
of matching data from different sources. Indeed, the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) regional classification does not always match the NUTS 2 level defined by Eurostat.15  
  
                                                        
14 DF-Beta is a specific measure of influence that assesses how each coefficient is changed by deleting a 
specific observation. It measures the influence of each observation on the coefficient of a particular 
independent variable (i.e. relative labour and relative income). On the basis of this test, two regions – 
London in the UK and Ovre Norrland in Sweden – were dropped due to their high influence on the 
coefficients. Note, however, that all the results reported in the paper are robust to the inclusion of 
these additional regions. These additional results, as well as the DF-Beta tests, can be obtained from 
the authors upon request.  
15 An alternative solution is to apply the FADN information at NUTS 1 and also to those NUTS 2 
regions where FADN data are lacking. Because our empirical strategy especially exploits the within-
region variation of out-farm migration and CAP payments, following this approach does not add 
substantial ‘new’ information to the model structure.  
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Table 1. Sample of country/regions considered 
 
Notes: Information is missing on the four French overseas departments, the two 
Portuguese regions Madeira and Azores, the two Greek regions Voreio Aigaio 
and Notio Aigaio, the Aland region in Finland, Northern Ireland in the UK, 
the Luxembourg state region and the Bruxelles-Capitale region in Belgium, 
due to lack of data. The London region in the UK and the Ovre Norrland in 
Sweden were dropped, being outliers (see text). 
4.1 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is the net migration rate, obtained as described in equation (3). In 
theory, to calculate migration we should use data on labour starting from census data. 
Unfortunately, such data are available every ten years and can only be transformed into 
annual series through interpolations. Consequently, because of data limitations, we were 
forced to use employment data to measure annual migration at the EU regional level. As 
highlighted by Butzer et al. (2003), these data present two sets of problems: first, they bring 
the demand for workers into the migration series; second they tend to be more erratic. 
Nevertheless, the trend still prevails. The basic employment data used to measure the net 
migration rate comes from Cambridge Econometrics’ Regional Database. 
4.2 Policy data 
Given our main objective, how we measure the policy variables at the regional level is a 
critical issue. Previous studies followed two main approaches. One entailed measuring a 
regionalised, producer subsidy equivalent, as in Anders et al. (2004), Tarditi & Zanias (2001) 
and more recently Hansen & Herrmann (2012). Another involved using the FADN, as in 
Shucksmith et al. (2005), and by combining the same source with Eurostat’s Regio New 
Cronos database, assuring in the former a time variation as well, as in Esposti (2007).  
In theory, the last approach is the most suited to our analysis where econometric 
identification is based on the within-region variation in CAP payments. Unfortunately it has 
two main shortcomings. First, Eurostat does not provide time series data at the regional level 
for all EU countries.16 Second and more importantly, Eurostat data is based on agricultural 
sector series, and so do not incorporate decoupled subsidies after 2005. Thus, their use 
                                                        
16 Esposti (2007) resolves this issue by applying the growth rate at the higher aggregation level (NUTS 
1) to those regions (NUTS 2) whose Eurostat data are lacking. 
Country NUTS Number of regions
Belgium (2) 10
Denmark (2) 5
Greece (2) 11
France (2) 22
Germany (1) 14
Ireland (2) 2
Italy (2) 21
The Netherlands (2) 12
Austria (2) 9
Portugal (2) 5
Finland (2) 4
Sweden (2) 7
Spain (2) 17
United Kingdom (1) 10
Total 149
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would reduce the time coverage of the analysis, and would preclude the possibility of 
investigating the possible differentiated effect between coupled and decoupled payments, as 
well as the effect of pillar II subsidies. 
To overcome these issues, we adopted a new strategy measuring CAP payments starting from 
the FADN data at the regional level. For every region covered by the FADN, we have the 
amount of payments received by the ‘average farm’ in each year over the period 1990–2008. 
To the extent that the average farm is representative of the farm population,17 computation of 
the ratio between such a farm’s CAP payments and the respective farm’s net income 
(inclusive of subsidies) offers the possibility to measure a consistent regional level of farm 
protection stemming from different policy measures of the CAP.  
Note that this approach is fully consistent with previous empirical exercises conducted on US 
out-farm migration (see Barkley, 1990; D’Antoni & Mishra, 2010), where the effect of 
government payments is measured using the ratio between farm subsidies to the farm value 
added at the aggregated (country) level.  
A key advantage of our approach is the possibility of disentangling total CAP payments into 
their distinct components (pillar I and pillar II). Specifically, we can distinguish between the 
coupled and decoupled payments of pillar I, as well as agri-environmental payments, those 
for less favoured areas (LFA), investment aids and a residual category called ‘other’ subsidies 
of pillar II.18 Note that some of the latter payments were introduced before Agenda 2000, and 
hence the ‘pillar II’ expression would not be fully correct. Nevertheless, we have chosen to use 
it to clearly and easily distinguish between CAP market subsidies and CAP structural policies.  
Finally, a potential limitation of our policy variable is that it does not capture the ‘price 
support’ component of CAP transfers – a component that was in place at a decreasing rate 
until 2003. It is important to note, however, that in our empirical model the price component 
of CAP protection is implicitly controlled for by the relative income variable, RI.  
4.3 Other covariates 
The intersectoral income differential is measured by the ratio of income in non-agriculture to 
that in agriculture (RI). Income is measured as gross value added (GVA) per worker, at 
constant and basic prices. For the non-agricultural sector we used the difference between 
total GVA and GVA in agriculture, as well as for non-agricultural employment.19 The data for 
GVAs and employment are from Cambridge Econometrics’ Regional Database. 
The other control variables included in the vectors Z are as follows. First, following Larson & 
Mundlak (1997) and others, we include the relative labour force (RL) calculated as the ratio 
                                                        
17 For each region, the FADN sample is stratified according to the type of farming (TF) and the 
economic size unit (ESU) class, while the same stratification is made for the regional farm population. 
Each stratum in the sample is then weighted to render its data representative of the underlying 
population. Such a procedure makes the FADN data representative at the regional level for TF and 
ESU, and indirectly for pillar I payments, while the same may not be said for pillar II payments. 
18 Pillar I includes ‘total subsidies on crops’, ‘total subsidies on livestock’ and ‘decoupled payments’. 
Pillar II includes ‘total support for rural development’ and ‘subsidies on investments’. Note, however, 
that for unknown reasons, in the FADN data the sum of the components of pillar II policies (agri-
environmental payments, LFA payments, investment aids and the residual category of ‘other’ 
subsidies) is slightly lower than the ‘aggregate’ pillar II subsidies.  
19 Models of the Harris–Todaro type suggest wages as a measure of (relative) labour returns. 
Nevertheless, many papers investigating out-farm migration equations have found that more robust 
results are obtained when relative income or productivity, instead of relative wages, is used. Mundlak 
(1979) and Larson & Mundlak (1997) justify this finding, arguing that for a long-term decision 
involving expectations, such as migration out of agriculture, income is thought to be a more 
informative measure of future prospects than wages, since wages are not the only component of a 
farmer's income. They also note that measurement problems with wage data are another reason to use 
relative income rather than relative wages. 
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of employment in the non-agricultural sector to that in the agricultural sector. Relative 
labour, on the one hand, captures the absorption capacity of non-agricultural sectors. On the 
other hand, given the direction of structural change with economic development, having a 
high level of (relative) agricultural employment means more potential migrants coming out 
of the farm sector. Therefore, its estimated effect can be either positive or negative. Second, 
to control for search costs and the probability of finding a job in the non-agricultural sector, 
we include the overall rate of unemployment and a measure of population density, calculated 
as the total population over the regional area in km2. This variable might account for several 
market conditions, in particular product and land markets (Glauben et al., 2006); 
furthermore, it represents a very rough proxy of the average ‘distance’ from urban areas. 
Third, we include a variable that measures the number of family workers. The underlying 
idea here is that a high number of family members working on the farm should lower the exit 
rate (Breustedt & Glauben, 2007).  
Finally, we also include a variable measuring country differences in labour market 
institutions, which increases with rigidities in labour entry and exit. Specifically, we use the 
OECD employment-protection indicator called ‘EP_v1’ (see OECD, 2010). This index is the 
average of six different sub-indices of ‘regular’ and ‘temporary’ contracts with a scale from 0 
(less restrictive) to 6 (most restrictive). The intuition is that higher labour rigidities should 
increase the costs of off-farm labour migration. A shortcoming of the index is that its time 
variation is obviously linked to labour market reforms, events that do not occur yearly, 
inducing a low time variation.  
Information on population, regional area, unemployment rate, total and sectoral 
employment come from Cambridge Econometrics’ Regional Database. Information on farm 
family workers comes from FADN, while the rigidity index of labour institutions is based on 
OECD data. Summary statistics of the variables explained above are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Source: See text. 
5. Econometric results 
Table 3 reports the static DID estimate of equation (4). The specifications differ with respect 
to how the policy variables are considered.20 Following D’Antoni & Mishra (2010), 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests were used to determine whether the data were 
                                                        
20 We test several potential non-linearities (i.e. square terms, threshold effects), focusing especially on 
the relative income and CAP variables. The data systematically reject these non-linearities, however. 
These additional results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Out-farm migration Growth rate 0.026 0.075 -0.939 0.375
Relative Income Ratio 2.114 1.461 0.475 30.92
Relative Labour Ratio 34.36 53.03 1.25 605.45
Unemployment rate % 8.52 5.06 1.59 36.11
Population density Persons /Km2 263.31 513.75 3.01 4796.32
Family Farm Labor Force Annual work unit 1.324 0.256 0.430 2.160
Total payments/VA Share 0.374 0.316 0.000 3.097
Pillar I payments/VA Share 0.276 0.217 0.000 1.982
Coupled payments/VA Share 0.226 0.215 0.000 1.982
Decoupled payments/VA Share 0.050 0.123 0.000 0.750
Pillar II payments/VA Share 0.098 0.144 0.000 1.172
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stationary.21 All variables, with the exception of the relative labour and unemployment rates, 
were found stationary. Thus, these variables were introduced in first difference in the static 
DID specification. 
Table 3. Out-farm migration and the CAP: Static difference-in-differences results 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Notes: Region and year fixed effects are included in each regression. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by region in parentheses.  
                                                        
21 Specifically, given the unbalanced panel structure of our dataset, use was made of the Maddala & Wu 
(1999) ADF test for unbalanced panel data.  
Dependent variable: Out-farm migration
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total payments -0.0083***
(0.0024)
Pillar I payments -0.0148***
(0.0045)
Coupled payments -0.0142***
(0.0043)
Decoupled payments -0.0472***
(0.0144)
Pillar II payments -0.0127*
(0.0065)
Agrienvironment -0.0225***
(0.0083)
Less favoured areas -0.0428
(0.0286)
Investment aids 0.0291
(0.0320)
Other pillar II payments -0.4274**
(0.2085)
Relative income 0.0132*** 0.0133*** 0.0134*** 0.0132*** 0.0129***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Relative labour (diff) 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Unemployment (diff) 0.1068 0.1062 0.0937 0.1071 0.1113
(0.1188) (0.1187) (0.1181) (0.1191) (0.1200)
Population density 0.0011 -0.0030 -0.0319 0.0082 -0.0111
(0.1206) (0.1208) (0.1208) (0.1204) (0.1206)
Family work -0.0108 -0.0110 -0.0121 -0.0104 -0.0124
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0084)
Labour  protection -0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0036 -0.0051 -0.0046
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0035)
Decoupling dummy -0.0018 -0.0119** -0.0034 0.0058 0.0089
(0.0071) (0.0054) (0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0070)
Constant -0.0391 -0.0143 0.0944 -0.0654 0.0116
(0.4577) (0.4581) (0.4583) (0.4571) (0.4578)
No. Groups 149 149 149 149 149
No. of obs. 2548 2548 2548 2548 2548
R-Sq 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
Adj. R-Sq 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Difference-in-differences
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In line with the labour migration model, the relative income between the non-farm and farm 
sector exerts a positive and significant effect on the level of out-farm migration (p-value < 
0.01). The estimated elasticity is around 1.1, therefore smaller than that estimated by Barkley 
(1990) for the US, and equal to 4.5. Notably, however, it lies in the same order of magnitude. 
Our lower estimated elasticity suggests that at the EU regional level, out-farm migration is 
less responsive to income differences. The changes in the relative labour force were also 
significant and positive. Thus, when there is a positive difference in the labour force ratio 
from one period to the next, farm labourers can increasingly be absorbed into the non-
agricultural sector, resulting in greater migration of labour from agriculture, a result close to 
D’Antoni & Mishra’s (2010) findings. 
Concerning the other covariates, family workers and the restrictiveness of labour protection 
institutions have the expected negative sign. By contrast, the effects of changes in the 
unemployment rate and population density were (often) unexpectedly positive. Even so, all 
these additional controls are always insignificantly different from zero in this specification.  
Moving to the CAP effects, column 1 of Table 3 considers the total level of CAP payments 
(pillar I plus pillar II). Its estimated coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
Overall, the CAP played a role in keeping labour in agriculture, ceteris paribus. This result 
confirms the finding by D’Antoni & Mishra (2010) for the US economy, but it goes in the 
opposite direction of that by Petrick & Zier (2011), who showed that excluding agri-
environmental payments, CAP subsidies significantly increase out-farm migration in three 
East German Länder.  
The subsequent regressions of Table 3 display results considering the CAP policy instruments 
separately. Note that we have been forced to conduct the analysis of pillar I and pillar II 
policies in isolation, as the two series are strongly collinear.22 Taking first the pillar I 
payments, the estimated policy coefficient is again negative and strongly significant, both in 
isolation (column 2) and when the effect between coupled and decoupled subsidies is split 
(column 3). 
Columns 4 and 5 show results for pillar II policies. Also this group of measures, taken as a 
whole, points to a significant, negative out-farm migration effect, although only at the 10% 
level. Still, this effect is heterogeneous across instruments. Splitting pillar II policies, we find 
that money directed at agri-environmental measures and the category of ‘other pillar II’ 
payments contributes significantly to job creation in agriculture. LFA payments exert an 
effect in the same direction, while investment aids, consistent with expectations, display a 
positive effect on out-farm migration, although both are statistically insignificant. Broadly 
speaking, the results of pillar II measures are more in line with the findings of Petrick & Zier 
(2011). Finally, in the DID specification we do not find any clear evidence of a policy shock 
due to the 2003 Fischler reform. Indeed, a dummy equal to 1, from 2005 onwards (0 
otherwise) switches from negative to positive and is often insignificant. 
Next, Table 4 introduces dynamics into the specification, by estimating an autoregressive 
model using the DIFF-GMM estimator. This strategy should shed further light on the 
robustness of our findings. First, the bottom of Table 4 reports standard tests to check for the 
consistency of the GMM estimator (see Roodman, 2009). The Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation indicates that second-order correlation is not present. On the contrary, the 
presence of first-order serial correlation suggests that the OLS estimator is inconsistent. 
Moreover, the standard Hansen test confirms that in all cases our set of instruments is valid.  
                                                        
22 The correlation coefficient between the two series is actually quite high, and equal to 0.50. Note, 
however, that by including pillar I and pillar II subsidies separately the resulting estimated coefficients 
could be biased owing to an omitted variable problem. To attenuate this bias, in the next section we 
also run regressions treating the CAP policy variables as endogenous.  
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Table 4. Out-farm migration and the CAP: Dynamic GMM differences results  
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Notes: Year fixed effects are included in each regression. Windmeijer-corrected, cluster-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The DIFF-GMM estimator is implemented in STATA using 
the xtabond2 routine with option laglimits (9), a two-step procedure and orthogonal deviation 
equation. 
The autocorrelation coefficient is significant and negative, although its magnitude is quite 
low, and around −0.08. A negative autocorrelation coefficient means that if the migration 
rate at the time t-1 is high, then it will be slightly lower at time t, a result consistent with the 
adjustment process under study.  
Dependent variable: Out-farm migration
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged migration -0.0803** -0.0803** -0.0802** -0.0802** -0.0817**
(0.0367) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0368) (0.0367)
Total payments -0.0094***
(0.0027)
Pillar I payments -0.0123***
(0.0041)
Coupled payments -0.0120***
(0.0040)
Decoupled payments -0.0319**
(0.0146)
Pillar II payments -0.0212***
(0.0077)
Agrienvironment -0.0316**
(0.0155)
Less favoured areas -0.0315
(0.0339)
Investment aids 0.0442
(0.0308)
Other pillar II payments -0.2597*
(0.1396)
Relative income 0.0150*** 0.0151*** 0.0152*** 0.0148*** 0.0146***
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0044)
Relative labour -0.0028*** -0.0028*** -0.0028*** -0.0028*** -0.0028***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Unemployment -0.1900** -0.1891** -0.1791** -0.1914** -0.1963**
(0.0832) (0.0826) (0.0827) (0.0840) (0.0769)
Population density 0.7334*** 0.7316*** 0.7018*** 0.7415*** 0.7267***
(0.1902) (0.1900) (0.1847) (0.1925) (0.1860)
Family work 0.0066 0.0068 0.0057 0.0067 0.0055
(0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0131)
Labour  protection -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0038 -0.0045 -0.0043
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0053)
Decoupling dummy -0.0163*** -0.0163*** -0.0104 -0.0165*** -0.0153***
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0055) (0.0055)
No. Instruments 33 33 34 33 36
No. Groups 149 149 149 149 149
No. of obs. 2360 2360 2360 2360 2360
Sargan 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.32 0.34
Hansen test (p-value) 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.65
AR1 test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR2 test (p-value) 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.74
DIFF-GMM
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The results of the DIFF-GMM estimator present some important differences. First, the 
relative labour ratio now negatively affects the migration rate and is strongly significant. 
Although the specification here is different from the static model (where the entered variable 
addresses non-stationarity), and therefore not fully comparable, this change in sign is 
surprising. At the same time, it is consistent with the idea that the larger the labour force in 
agriculture relative to the non-agricultural sector, the more out-farm migrants can be 
expected; in other words, regions tend to converge on a similar level of the relative labour 
ratio. Second, and in line with the a priori expectation, in the dynamic model the 
unemployment rate negatively affects the rate of out-farm migration and is significant at the 
5% level. Third, consistent with the intuition, the population density is now positive and 
strongly significant. Finally, the Fischler reform dummy for the introduction of decoupling 
(equal to 1 from 2005 onwards) is now negative and significant in all the specifications, but 
not in the one where pillar I payments are split into coupled and decoupled subsidies (see 
column 3).” This result is puzzling. On the one hand it seems to suggest that the Fischler 
reform induced a policy shock that decreased the likelihood of the farmer’s decision to exit 
the agricultural sector. On the other hand, as we better discuss in the next section, the 
migration elasticity of decoupled subsidies is significantly lower in absolute value than that of 
coupled payments. A possible explanation for this counterintuitive result could lie in the 
commodities price spike of 2007 and 2008. Indeed, commodity prices had already started to 
rise slowly in 2005–06, thus at least partially overlapping with the Fischler reform effect.  
Moving to policy variables, their estimated coefficients are always negative and significant, 
giving broad confirmation of the DID results. Considering first the pillar I policies (columns 2 
and 3), the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is slightly lower (in absolute value) than 
the corresponding static estimates reported in Table 3. This result is not surprising as their 
coefficients capture short-run effects. Yet the picture changes somewhat when the policy 
variables considered are those related to pillar II. In this case (see columns 4 and 5) the 
absolute magnitude of the coefficients often shows a slight increase on passing from the static 
to the dynamic specification, although the pattern of the effects remains quite similar.  
5.1 Robustness checks  
Table 5 reports some robustness checks. For practical reasons let us focus only on total CAP 
payments (panel a), pillar I payments (panel b) and pillar II payments (panel c).23 Columns 1 
and 2 display results from an OLS and a least square with dummy variables (LSDV) estimator 
applied to equation (5), with a specification identical to the regressions of Table 4. The CAP 
effects are still negative and always significant, with the exclusion of pillar II payments in the 
OLS specification.  
                                                        
23 This is because running GMM regressions with many left-hand side variables treated as endogenous 
induce the well-known problem of instrument proliferation, rendering identification of the CAP effects 
problematic.  
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Table 5. Out-farm migration and the CAP: Robustness checks  
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Notes: Year fixed effects are included in each regression. Windmeijer-corrected, cluster-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. See the notes of Table 4 for details on the GMM estimator. 
In the GMM regressions of columns 4 and 5, the CAP policy variable is treated as endogenous, 
and instrumented by its lagged levels and differences.  
As is well known, these two additional estimators suffer from dynamic panel bias, the lagged 
dependent variable being biased upwards and downwards, respectively. Good estimates of 
the true parameter should therefore lie in the range between the OLS and LSDV values – or 
at least near it given that these numbers are themselves point estimates with associated 
confidence intervals (Roodman, 2009). As Bond (2002) pointed out, this provides a useful 
check on results from theoretically superior estimators. As can be seen, all the GMM 
Dependent variable: Out-farm migration
OLS LSDV SYS-GMM
Exogenous Endogenous Endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel (a) Total payments
Lagged migration -0.0668** -0.0904*** -0.0803** -0.0767** -0.0847*
(0.0275) (0.0259) (0.0367) (0.0385) (0.0430)
Total payments -0.0068** -0.0084** -0.0094*** -0.0122*** -0.0132***
(0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0047)
No. of obs. 2425 2425 2360 2360 2512
No. Groups 149 149 149 149 149
No. Instruments 33 38 41
R-Sq 0.490 0.540
Sargan 0.340 0.480 0.200
Hansen test (p-value) 0.630 0.630 0.160
Diff-in-Hansen test 0.383
AR1 test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 test (p-value) 0.700 0.670 0.780
Panel (b) Pillar I payments
Lagged migration -0.0675** -0.0906*** -0.0803** -0.0721* -0.0782*
(0.0275) (0.0258) (0.0366) (0.0383) (0.0424)
Pillar I -0.0136*** -0.0150** -0.0123*** -0.0187*** -0.0166**
(0.0044) (0.0061) (0.0041) (0.0067) (0.0074)
No. of obs. 2425 2425 2360 2360 2512
No. Groups 149 149 149 149 149
No. Instruments 33 38 41
R-Sq 0.490 0.540
Sargan 0.360 0.580 0.300
Hansen test (p-value) 0.650 0.820 0.370
Diff-in-Hansen test 0.345
AR1 test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 test (p-value) 0.710 0.590 0.670
Panel (c) Pillar II payments
Lagged migration -0.0670** -0.0905*** -0.0802** -0.0691* -0.0844*
(0.0275) (0.0259) (0.0368) (0.0407) (0.0448)
Pillar II -0.0044 -0.0134* -0.0212*** -0.0282*** -0.0318***
(0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0063) (0.0092)
No. of obs. 2425 2425 2360 2360 2512
No. Groups 149 149 149 149 149
No. Instruments 33 38 41
R-Sq 0.490 0.540
Sargan 0.320 0.230 0.110
Hansen test (p-value) 0.620 0.070 0.020
Diff-in-Hansen test 0.149
AR1 test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 test (p-value) 0.700 0.610 0.800
DIFF-GMM 
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regressions reported in the table display a magnitude of the autocorrelation coefficient that 
systematically falls within the OLS and LSDV range, giving further credence to the robustness 
of GMM results.  
Column 4 exploits one of the key properties of the difference GMM estimator, treating the 
CAP variable as endogenous and instrumenting it with its lagged values. For all the CAP 
payments considered, the estimated effect is still negative and strongly significant, also 
showing a slight increase in their (absolute) magnitude (compare columns 3 and 4). Again, all 
the specification tests reported at the bottom of each panel indicate well-specified models. 
Hence, our results are robust to possible endogeneity bias stemming from political economy 
motives or measurement errors in the CAP variables (or both). Moreover, note that by 
treating CAP payments as endogenous, we indirectly control for the potential, omitted 
variable bias induced by treating pillar I and pillar II payments separately in the 
regressions.24 We return to this point later.  
Finally, column 5 reports a further robustness check by running a system GMM regression. 
This estimator, exploiting the additional orthogonality condition of the level equation, should 
work better in the presence of strong persistency in dependent variables and in any other 
explanatory variable not treated as strictly exogenous. This is because lagged levels of the 
dependent (explanatory) variable tend to be weak instruments for actual first differences (see 
Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). In our specific situation, we are especially 
worried about persistence in CAP subsidies when this variable is treated as endogenous. 
Nevertheless, when running the system GMM regression the results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively very close.  
5.2 Discussion 
Consistent comparison of the job creation effects of different CAP policies can be made on the 
basis of their respective elasticities (see Table 6). Several interesting patterns emerge. First, a 
1% increase in total CAP payments decreases out-farm migration by about 0.117% when the 
effect is estimated using the static DID estimator, a value that rises to 0.144% when dynamics 
are accounted for and to 0.187% when CAP subsidies are treated as endogenous. Thus, the 
magnitude of the overall economic effect is rather moderate, but it increases when dynamics 
and endogeneity are taken into account.  
                                                        
24 More generally, the increase in the absolute magnitude of the estimated effect when CAP payments 
are treated as endogenous is consistent with different forms of endogeneity bias. Indeed, if political 
economy motives are at work, then politicians tend to increase CAP payments in response to an 
increase in out-farm migration, inducing a positive correlation between these two variables and a bias 
towards zero of the (negative) effect of subsidies on migration. Similarly, measurement error in an 
explanatory variable suffers the well-known attenuation bias problem, which induces a bias towards 
zero of its estimated effect. Finally, if the endogeneity bias is the result of running regressions 
separately for pillar I and pillar II policies, then it could also be the case that this omitted variable 
problem can translate into a (absolute) downward bias in the estimated effect of the policy variables.  
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Table 6. Out-farm migration elasticity to CAP payments  
 
Notes: This table reports sample mean elasticities of CAP policy variables based on difference-in-
difference, and the DIFF-GMM regression results of Tables 3, 4 and 5, respectively. 
This average effect cancels out relevant differences across CAP instruments. The long-run 
elasticity of pillar I payments, equal to about 0.2% when dynamics and endogeneity are 
considered (see columns 3 and 5), is actually two times higher in absolute magnitude than 
the elasticity of pillar II policies. In pillar I, the coupled payments display higher absolute 
elasticity than decoupled payments, while across pillar II instruments, agri-environmental 
payments display the higher absolute elasticity to out-farm migration. Note, however, that 
the last results should be treated with caution, as they are obtained without taking into 
account the endogeneity of CAP payments, due to the difficulty of running GMM regressions 
with many instruments.  
Interestingly, using the magnitude of the estimated elasticities of pillar I and pillar II 
payments can shed some light on the source of bias of the different estimators. Consider for 
example the estimated elasticities based on the DIFF-GMM reported in column 2 of Table 6. 
The weighted sum of pillar I and pillar II elasticities is significantly lower than the estimated 
elasticity of total payments.25 If we exclude aggregation bias, one possibility is that this bias is 
the result of estimating the effect of pillar I and pillar II policies in isolation. If this is the 
case, then by treating the CAP payments as endogenous, this bias should be attenuated or 
eliminated. This is exactly what we find in the data. Indeed, the weighted sum of pillar I and 
pillar II elasticities from columns 3 and 5 give precisely the estimated elasticities of the total 
payments reported in the respective first row. This result gives some support to the idea that 
the endogeneity of CAP payments is, if anything, due to omitted variable bias more than to a 
simultaneity problem. 
Finally, with our estimates at hand and based on a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we may 
quantify the job creation effect of the CAP. According to the parameter estimates from 
column 1 of Table 4, a marginal increase in the explanatory variable ‘total payments’ makes 
the dependent variable decrease by 0.0094 points. Using the average value across the panel 
(that is 0.374, see Table 2) and multiplying for the parameter estimates (−0.0094) we obtain 
−0.00352, that is the reducing average effect of CAP subsidies in terms of out-farm 
migration. Multiplying such a value for the average stock of agricultural workers (6.897 
million/year), we can obtain a rough estimate of the flow of out-farm migration prevented by 
CAP payments, which is 24,247 agricultural workers per year. To render such a value in 
percentage terms, consider that without subsidies, the annual out-farm migration rate would 
                                                        
25 Starting from the sample share of pillar I and pillar II payments, equal to 75% and 25% respectively, 
we can measure the resulting total payment elasticity as [(−0.142*0.75)+(−0.083*0.25)]= −0.127. This 
number is actually lower than the estimated total payment elasticity of −0.144.  
Exogen. Endogen. Exogen. Endogen.
Total payments -0.117 -0.144 -0.187 -0.133 -0.172
Pillar I payments -0.157 -0.142 -0.214 -0.131 -0.199
   Coupled payments -0.123 -0.113 _ -0.104 _
   Decoupled payments -0.091 -0.067 _ -0.061 _
Pillar II payments -0.045 -0.083 -0.108 -0.076 -0.101
   Agrienvironment -0.033 -0.051 _ -0.047 _
   Less favoured areas -0.030 -0.024 -0.022
   Investment 0.019 0.031 _ 0.029 _
   Other pillar II payments -0.017 -0.012 -0.011
DID
Difference GMM
Long-run Short-run
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increase from the actual rate of 0.0260 to 0.0295. The effect of CAP payments, then, reduces 
the rate of farm labour migration by around 11.9% – not an irrelevant number.26 This back-
of-the-envelope calculation is based on the point estimate of the benchmark specification in 
column 1 of Table 4. Thus, taking into account the confidence interval around that point 
estimate, the percentage reduction of the out-farm migration rate attributable to the CAP is 
still positive, ranging from a minimum of about 5% to maximum 17%. A conservative view is 
to interpret the back-of-the-envelope calculation as saying that the CAP subsidies might 
generate a reduction of out-farm migration, although the effect can be rather moderate. 
6. Conclusions 
Understanding the effects of CAP policies is important, as a deeper comprehension of their 
incidence would allow the design of better policies. This paper contributes in this direction by 
studying how different CAP instruments affected job creation in agriculture across 149 EU 
regions over the 1990–2008 period. In the neoclassical two-sector model, intersectoral 
labour migration is affected by income differences across sectors, ceteris paribus. Therefore, 
to the extent that CAP policies have been effective in transferring income to farmers, they 
should have contributed to a reduction in the rate of out-farm migration.  
This paper has attempted to test these predictions by exploiting the within-region and cross-
regional variations in out-farm migration and CAP policies. Using both static and dynamic 
panel data methods, allowing also for the possible endogeneity of the CAP, we find robust 
evidence that the CAP has played a role in keeping labour forces in agriculture, although the 
overall effect is rather small. Among CAP instruments, we show that so far pillar I payments 
are the most effective policy in reducing out-farm migration, with coupled subsidies showing 
an elasticity to out-farm migration significantly higher than decoupled ones. The effect of 
pillar II payments on job creation is significantly lower than that of pillar I payments, and 
conditional on the instruments considered.  
With regard to the other conditioning variables, the results give broad confirmation that 
relative income is an important determinant of the decision to migrate from agriculture. Still, 
its elasticity to out-farm migration is quite low when compared with similar studies 
conducted in other countries, such as the US. This suggests that at the EU regional level, out-
farm migration is less responsive to income differences, or put differently, other important 
forces are at work in affecting farmers’ decisions to migrate. Moreover, we also find notable 
effects on the migration decision of standard structural variables, such as relative labour, the 
unemployment rate and population density – all factors that affect migration costs.  
Our results confirm that the use of a dynamic panel specification is appropriate in this kind of 
exercise, and also that irrespective of the specification and estimator used, the CAP payments 
systematically exert a negative effect on the rate of farm labour migration. Thus, the 
comparison of these results with previous studies on the impact of EU policies on the labour 
market reveals the criticality of how the policy effect is measured and identified in the 
empirical model.  
An interesting implication of the study, which comes from the structure of the conceptual 
model, is related to the ‘efficiency’ of CAP payments in transferring income to farmers. 
Indeed, although several previous works have documented an overall inefficiency of 
(coupled) agricultural payments (e.g. OECD, 2001), our results seem to contradict this 
conclusion, at least partially. This appears in line with the most recent evidence, reported in 
Michalek et al. (2011), which shows that farmers gain from 60% to 95% of the value of CAP 
coupled payments, and only a marginal fraction of such payments is capitalised into land 
rent. Clearly, future research is needed to better understand these aspects. 
                                                        
26 There are several caveats behind this calculation. For example, concerning the consequences, we are 
assuming that the effects are fairly homogeneous across regions. Yet relaxing this assumption would 
be beyond the scope of our analysis.  
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